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Independence Standards Board
Appraisals and Valuation Services

Executive Summary
1. This discussion memorandum is the first step in a process that will
culminate in the issuance of formal independence guidance on appraisal and
valuation services that audit firm professionals can or cannot provide public
company audit clients. The project developed in recognition of the need for
clear guidance delineating acceptable activities versus those that would impair
the independence of the auditor, and out of a desire to bring some consistency
to accepted practice.

2.

The memorandum discusses:
a. the current rules governing provision of appraisal and valuation
services by audit firm professionals to audit clients;

b. professional standards governing appraisal and valuation specialists;
c. threats to auditor independence that the provision of these services
may pose;

d. possible criteria that the Board might use in setting standards
governing these services; and
e. safeguards that some suggest may be effective in protecting
independence when firm professionals perform these services for audit
clients.

3.
Readers are asked to respond to a variety of questions following the
discussion. Readers are asked whether the discussion memorandum identifies
all the threats to auditor independence that these services may pose, and to
comment on several alternatives that the Board might use in developing
standards. The discussion memorandum also asks whether there are other
distinctions among offered services that the Board could use in standard
setting. Finally, readers are asked whether safeguards could effectively protect
auditor independence if audit firm professionals were allowed to provide some
of these services to audit clients.
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Background
4.
The provision of certain appraisal and valuation services1 by auditors to
audit clients has received some attention from regulators and standard-setters
over the past year. While some believe that providing these services could
impair the auditor’s independence with respect to an audit client, certain
exceptions to a complete prohibition have historically been allowed. Others
believe that safeguards can adequately protect auditor independence when firm
professionals perform appraisals and valuations for audit clients.
5.
Recently, the SEC Staff has expressed independence concerns regarding
auditor valuations of “in-process research and development costs,” as part of an
auditor-assisted allocation of the purchase price of an acquired business to its
individual assets and liabilities. This allocation assistance has historically been
permitted, but the significance of the in-process R&D valuations to the financial
statements of some companies has caused the Staff to question whether
auditors should perform them for audit clients.

6.
This focus on these services also highlighted several inconsistencies or
anomalies in the existing rules, which some believe may be outdated. In
addition, the Board recently issued guidance on assisting audit clients in the
implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments
and Hedging Activities. That project made clear the need for general guidance
as to the extent of assistance that auditors can provide audit clients in valuing
assets (or liabilities) while preserving their independence. Accordingly, the
Board is issuing this discussion memorandum to solicit comment on the
independence issues related to auditor provision of appraisal and valuation
services. The Board’s objective is to develop standards delineating the
circumstances in which providing these services would impair auditor
independence.
7.
Audit firms may provide a wide-variety of appraisal and valuation services.
These services may include:
1 The American Society of Appraisers, a professional organization representing all disciplines of appraisal
practice, defines appraising as (1) the estimation of the cost of producing or replacing physical property; (2)
the forecasting of the monetary earning power of certain classes of property; (3) the valuation or
determination of the worth of property. The Society defines property to include the “legal rights of
ownership of tangible or intangible entities.” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Simon & Schuster, 1974)
defines “appraise” as “to set a value on,” while defining “valuation” as “the act or process of valuing,” the
“appraisal of property.” In this paper, the terms “appraisal” and “valuation” are used interchangeably, and
are meant to include the process of valuing assets, both tangible and intangible, and liabilities.
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a. the allocation of the purchase price of an acquired business to its
individual assets and liabilities;

b. valuation of in-process research and development costs;
c. valuation of derivatives;

d. valuation of stock options;
e. calculation of pension plan and other post-employment benefit
liabilities;

f. valuations for estate and gift tax purposes;
g. valuation of environmental liabilities;
h. appraisal of real estate or collateral supporting loans; and

i. valuation of insurance reserves.

Current Rules

8.
The independence rules on rendering appraisal and valuation services to
audit clients distinguish between:

a. firm specialists assisting the audit team in auditing a client’s financial
statements; and
b. separate engagements to appraise or value a client’s assets or
liabilities.
There are no independence concerns when audit teams use firm specialists
such as appraisers to assist in auditing the fair value of a company’s assets and
liabilities. The concern arises when the audit firm appraiser’s work becomes
the client’s primary support for recording amounts or the basis for business
decisions (e.g., determining a buy or sell price for an asset).

SEC Independence Rules and Regulations2

9.
In general, the SEC Staff has independence guidance which limits the
auditor’s ability to provide appraisal and valuation services to audit clients.
Such limitations reflect concerns about auditor provision of these services
which include:

2 “No action” letters issued by the SEC Staff: Touche Ross & Co., December 10, 1985, Kenneth Levanthol
& Company, May 24, 1988, and Pannell Kerr Forster, July 11, 1988.
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a. the possibility that the auditor would not be objective in reviewing the
value of an asset or liability calculated by a colleague or group within his
or her firm (i.e., concerns related to “self-review”).

b. development of an inappropriate “mutuality of interest” between the
auditor and the client. Appraisal and valuation methodology often involves
the use of cash flow projections, or other forecasts of the company’s future
results.3 The concern is that the auditor could become committed to
projections used in the appraisal that he or she may have developed or
assisted the client in developing - projections also used in determining
whether, for example, asset impairments have occurred, or the company
will be able to satisfy its obligations to creditors.
c. The decisions required in the valuation process have been
characterized as “management responsibilities,” which conflict with the
responsibilities of the auditor. Activities that are generally considered
management responsibilities include consummating transactions, having
custody of assets, and otherwise exercising authority on behalf of the
company. With respect to appraisals and valuations, activities that might
be considered responsibilities of management include the pricing of a
company’s product, or determining the sales price of a subsidiary or other
asset.
10. The auditor is permitted, however, to provide appraisal and valuation
services in certain circumstances. For example, auditors have historically been
permitted to assist the client in allocating the purchase price of an acquired
business to its individual assets and liabilities, in a purchase business
combination, which often results in the auditor performing some valuation
work. Some have suggested that this exception to the general rule was based
on:
a. the fixed total to be allocated to individual assets and liabilities (the
actual purchase price of the acquired business);

b. the “brick and mortar” or relatively straightforward nature of assets
and liabilities in the past. Typically, companies have not had the level of
intangible assets or complex financial instruments, for example, that are
common today; and

c. the typically long life over which the appraised assets (e.g., property,
plant, and equipment) were amortized, making the annual impact of any
incorrect amounts less likely to be significant.

11. Other auditor allocations of fixed amounts have been prohibited, even if
they do not have direct financial statement consequences. For example, the
auditor cannot allocate the market value of a company, represented by the
value of its publicly-traded stock, among the company’s three divisions.
Presumably, the theory behind the prohibition is that cash flow or other
3 The terms “prospective financial information,” “projections,” and “forecasts” have specific meanings in
the auditing literature. They are used informally, however, in this paper, and as synonyms.
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projections would be prepared to support the value of each division, and these
projections, for example, may impact an asset impairment evaluation, or the
auditor’s assessment of whether debt covenant violations are on the horizon.
The auditor may be biased towards forecasts he or she prepared or assisted in
preparing, when an objective analysis of these projections would reveal that
they required substantial revisions. Some also believe such valuations involve
more judgmental matters than purchase-price allocations would typically
involve.
12. Historically, the SEC Staff has not objected to auditor-provided appraisals
for estate tax purposes. In some cases, however, the results of these appraisals
can have financial statement consequences. Auditors have also been permitted
to value employee benefit plan liabilities for audit clients, possibly because
generally accepted accounting principles require the amortization of any
changes in the valuation from year to year, thus reducing the impact of the
changes on annual earnings.

AICPA Rules Applicable to All Auditors
13. In performing appraisals, all auditors must comply with the independence
requirements of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
(auditors of public companies must also comply with SEC rules where these are
more restrictive). AICPA rules currently permit auditor performance of
appraisal or valuation services, the results of which may be incorporated in the
audit client’s financial statements, if all of the significant matters of judgment
involved are determined or approved by the client, and the client is in a position
to have an informed judgment on the results of those services.4 In addition,
under Statement of Auditing Standards No. 73, Using the Work of a Specialist
(SAS 73), the auditor has certain responsibilities when relying on the work of a
specialist, including an appraisal or valuation expert on the audit firm’s staff.
When relying on a specialist, SAS 73 requires the auditor to assess the:

a. professional qualifications of the specialist;
b. objectives and scope of the specialist’s work;
c. relationship between the specialist and the client (i.e., the specialist’s
objectivity);

d. methods or assumptions used;

e. methods or assumptions used compared to those used in the preceding
period;
f. appropriateness of using the specialist’s work for the intended purpose;
and
4 AICPA Professional Standards: Code ofProfessional Conduct, Interpretation 101-3 Under Rule of
Conduct 101: Performance of Other Services.
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g. the form and content of the specialist’s findings - information provided
must allow the auditor to obtain an understanding of the methods and
assumptions used, make appropriate tests of the data used by the
specialist, and evaluate whether the findings support the related
assertions in the financial statements.

14. SAS 73 does not apply to situations where firm specialists directly assist
the audit team in performing the audit.
SEC Practice Section Rules5

15. The AICPA’s SEC Practice Section also has membership rules for audit
firms, including ones governing provision of actuarial services to insurance
company audit clients. Because the actuarial function is basic to the operation
and management of an insurance company, the Practice Section rules conclude
that the CPA firm cannot assume responsibility for this function without
jeopardizing its independence. Therefore, the CPA firm cannot provide actuarial
advisory services to an audit client involving the determination of policy
reserves. Rather, the client must have its own actuaries (internal or external)
that provide primary actuarial capabilities.

Standards Governing Appraisers and Valuation Experts
16. Appraisers themselves have ethical codes and professional standards,
which recognize the responsibilities and obligations that these professionals
have to the public and their profession, beyond those due to their clients. For
example, the Appraisal Institute’s6 Code of Professional Ethics states that
“.... [because] proper appraisal, consulting, and review gives stability to real
estate loans and investments and this in turn helps to promote public
confidence in the economy that sustains a free society.... ethical responsibilities
and obligations are due to both the public and the profession.” The ethics
provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, issued by
the Appraisal Standards Board,7 states that the appraiser “must perform
assignments with impartiality, objectivity, and independence and without
accommodation of personal interests.... it is unethical for an appraiser to use or
communicate a misleading or fraudulent report or to knowingly permit an
employee or other person to communicate a misleading or fraudulent report.”
The Principles of Appraisal Practice and Code of Ethics of the American Society of

5 SEC Practice Section Reference Manual, SECPS §1000.35. The SEC Practice Section membership
consists of most firms that audit public companies. Members of the Practice Section must comply with its
rules and regulations.
6 The Appraisal Institute is a professional organization for commercial and residential real estate appraisers
with 19,000 members. The Institute offers professional designation programs, and members must adhere to
its Code of Professional Ethics.
7 The Appraisal Standards Board is part of The Appraisal Foundation. The Board’s Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice are recognized throughout the U.S. as the generally accepted standards of
professional practice for real estate, personal property, and business appraisal. Over eighty organizations,
corporations, and government agencies are affiliated with The Appraisal Foundation, as Sponsoring
Organizations or Advisory Council members.
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Appraisers8 recognizes the appraiser’s fiduciary relationship to third parties,
stating that “[m]embers of the Society recognize their responsibility to those
third parties, other than the client, who may be specifically entitled to make use
of their reports.”

17. The ethical standards governing the appraiser do not permit association
with a report that the appraiser believes is misleading, even if the report clearly
states that the client, rather than the appraiser, takes responsibility for the
assumptions and judgments inherent in the work. Therefore, to comply with
both the appraisal standards and AICPA rules governing auditors, an appraiser
(whether or not associated with the audit firm) and the firm’s audit client must,
in effect, agree on the assumptions and judgments inherent in the appraisal.
The AICPA’s requirement for appraisals performed for an audit client - that “all
of the significant matters of judgment involved are determined or approved by
the client” - does not diminish the appraiser’s obligation to stand behind his or
her work and the assumptions inherent in that work, even though the audit
client also takes responsibility for these assumptions and judgments.

Threats to Independence

Self-Review
18. Some believe that the “second look” - the review of the financial statement
amounts by a second, impartial party - is fundamental to auditing. They
believe that auditors may lack the requisite skepticism when reviewing their
own work or the work of colleagues in their firms. Or worse yet, the auditor
may be reluctant to challenge the work of a colleague, or to disclose and insist
upon correction of a colleague’s error. The notion that the auditor should
not be placed in the position of auditing his or her own work (or the work of a
colleague) centers on these concerns related to “self-review.”

19. Others argue that auditors successfully contend with the requirement to
review and get comfortable with the work of many specialists or consultants in
their firm. For example, the audit partner reviews the work of firm specialists
performing tax work such as preparation of tax returns for a client.
Presumably these auditors are occasionally faced with the responsibility of
pointing out and correcting errors made by their colleagues. Or, the audit team
may find itself auditing books and records produced by a computer system that
its consultants assisted the client in installing. In addition, in performing an
audit, auditors sometimes discover misstatements in prior year financial
statements upon which they previously reported, necessitating restatements
and discussion in the auditors’ report. This group believes that auditors face
these conflicts periodically, and that there is no widespread evidence that

8 The American Society of Appraisers is a professional organization representing all disciplines of appraisal
practice. Each accredited member of the Society must possess a professional designation in one or more
specialized areas of appraisal, pass written technical and ethics examinations, and submit appraisal reports
for peer review.
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auditors have failed to thoroughly review the work of colleagues, or that they
have hidden their own or their colleagues’ mistakes.
20. Proponents of firm provision of these services to audit clients would argue
that current rules (SAS 73) require the audit team to carefully review the work
of a firm appraiser engaged by the client. Required audit procedures are the
same whether the appraiser is a firm specialist or a third party. In addition,
other audit rules, such as those governing second partner reviews, and the way
in which firms structure audit engagements often result in several firm auditors
reviewing the same reports and support for account balances provided as audit
evidence. In many cases, depending on audit risk and materiality, there are
separate reviews by the senior accountant, manager, partner, and second
partner. This group believes that these multiple reviews effectively dispel worry
over losing the “second look” provided by the audit.
Mutuality of Interests and Acting in the Capacity of Management

21. Some argue that valuations of non-financial statement items performed by
the auditor also threaten the auditor’s independence. Because appraisal
methodology often involves projections of future cash flows and results, they
believe that the auditor developing such forecasts may later fail to question
them or assess them with the requisite skepticism, when they are subsequently
used to support the reported value of an asset or liability on the financial
statements. The auditor and the client will have a “mutual interest” in
rationalizing such a forecast. In addition, this group asserts that the decisions
made by the valuation specialist are “management decisions” that should not
be made by the auditor.
22. Others believe that projections and forecasts are recognized by auditors,
appraisal professionals, companies, and users of financial statements as
estimates, and that changing circumstances or unforeseen events do not mean
that the original projections or valuations were inappropriate when issued.
This group argues that the auditor would not feel compelled to accept stale
projections originally developed by a firm appraisal specialist when these
projections showed outcomes that were no longer likely of realization. They
contend, for example, that auditors routinely argue for increases (or decreases)
in loss reserves, even when firm specialists and the audit team “signed-off” on
such reserves in the prior year. In addition, current rules permit the auditor to
report on prospective financial information,9 a practice which some argue would
pose the same risk of the auditor becoming committed to a set of projections.
Yet performance of these services has not been identified as the cause of
subsequent auditor independence problems.

9 Current independence rules allow the auditor to report on, but not prepare, prospective financial
information that may be used by third parties in accordance with certain guidelines.
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23. Some believe that third-party appraisers - those not connected to either
the client or the audit firm - may have more of a bias in favor of the client’s
interests (a mutuality of interests) when performing an appraisal. While
appraisal professionals have an ethical code of conduct and standards requiring
that they perform their work impartially and in an unbiased manner, some
argue that it is very difficult not to have some bias in favor of the interests of a
paying customer. The fact that an appraiser works for the firm that performs
the audit of the client’s financial statements may provide an added incentive to
perform the work objectively.
24. On the other hand, if fees have an adverse effect on objectivity, some
believe that effect is compounded when the client is also paying an annual
audit fee. The third-party appraiser may have more infrequent engagements
with the client, which some believe would lessen the desire to compromise
objectivity to please the client. Countering that is the argument that the size of
the total fees should be compared to the firm’s total revenue, if there is a
concern that fees can adversely influence objectivity.

Possible Criteria for Standard-Setting

Materiality and Efficiency
25. Some contend that valuations of immaterial assets or liabilities by
specialists in the audit firm do not impair auditor independence. They may
acknowledge the threats to auditor independence that some suggest are posed
by firm provision of these services - the threat of self-review and a mutuality of
interest with the client. They believe, however, that services should not be
proscribed unless they threaten audit quality, and ask how these threats could
impact audit quality when the amounts being appraised or valued are
immaterial to the financial statements. Consequently, they believe that the
rules should only prohibit firm provision of appraisal and valuation services to
an audit client when the amounts involved could have a material impact on the
client’s financial statements.
26. Others suggest that materiality is difficult to define, especially when the
result of the service itself is an estimate of value. They ask why the rules
should allow immaterial valuations for audit clients, when others parties
uninvolved in the audit can provide them just as competitively. The audit firm
has only a minimal efficiency advantage in performing these services, they
believe, and the relatively small fees that could be earned from valuing
immaterial items would be offset by the cost of additional safeguards imposed
to protect auditor independence. This group believes that an audit firm
appraiser would not have any special knowledge of the client’s affairs that
would enable a more efficient or effective appraisal project.
27. Others contend that if there is no significant threat to independence, the
marketplace should determine whether the auditor has an efficiency advantage.
They argue that the client may be comfortable with the quality of its audit firm
and the professionalism of its specialists, and may not have the time to
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research the reputation and qualifications of other specialists. Audit firm
personnel, who may have a rapport with client management, may be able to
quickly locate the right specialists within the firm to satisfy the client’s
valuation requirements. In addition, if the auditor uses the work of a firm
specialist, engaged by the client to appraise certain assets or liabilities, then
compliance with the requirements of SAS 73 is easier and more efficient. For
example, the auditor would not have to assess the qualifications and reputation
of the specialist, as this would already have been done on a firm-wide level.

28. Contributing more to efficiency, and more importantly, to audit quality,
this group argues, would be the auditor’s good rapport with a firm specialist.
They believe that a firm specialist would be more inclined than a third party to
quickly respond to the auditor’s request for the data and assumptions used in
the valuation (so that the auditor could test them), and to explain the scope,
purpose, and results of the work performed. More significantly, a third party
appraiser, some believe, may have a certain reluctance to be completely open,
frank, and thorough in his or her conversations with the client’s auditor - a
reticence that most would not expect from a specialist connected with the audit
firm.

29. Supporters also believe that a service should not be proscribed unless its
provision poses a significant risk to auditor independence. They do not believe
that the auditor’s independence is impaired when a firm specialist values
immaterial items.
30. Somewhat related to the “efficiency” argument is the belief of some that
strong valuation expertise resident in the audit firm contributes to audit
quality. This group believes that auditors today need the expertise of a variety
of specialists to perform an effective audit. Having that expertise within the
firm contributes to efficiency. They believe that the ability to provide a wide
variety of professional opportunities to such experts is important in attracting
and retaining the best talent. They believe that unnecessary restrictions on the
work that firm specialists can perform for audit clients hinders the firms’ ability
to retain high caliber professionals.
31. Others disagree with this argument, pointing out that restrictions on
services that can be provided by firms to audit clients do not impair the firms’
ability to provide professional opportunities to firm specialists. Theoretically,
the pool of work available to specialists working for audit firms is not reduced
just because firms cannot provide certain services to audit clients, they
contend.
Level of Judgment Required

32. Another way to approach standards for auditor provision of appraisal and
valuation services may be to allow those where:
a. the methodology used is well-established and there are few, if any,
choices among alternative methodologies; and
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b. the required assumptions are more routine, based on published
statistics, or less subjective.
33. For example, an accepted methodology for valuing stock options is the
Black-Scholes model - a model that is well-established and not subject to a
great deal of variation. While specialists using the model may not have
identical results, some believe differences in value are not likely to be material.
They contend that the information about the options that must be provided is
both objective and subjective. Assumptions such as volatility and expected
dividend yield are largely based on trading history, however, and the expected
option life, an estimate, is based on some factual data, such as the option’s
term, vesting period, past history for similar grants, and stock volatility. Thus,
they assert, the model produces consistent results in the hands of different
specialists. They argue that the independence rules should allow the auditor to
perform these routine valuations for audit clients, even if appraisals requiring a
higher degree of judgment are prohibited. The lack of judgment involved in
some valuations, they believe, mitigates the threat that the auditor is assuming
management functions.

34. Others may agree with the rationale behind such a distinction in the
independence rules - a distinction based on the level of judgment involved in
the valuation - but ask whether rules like these would be operational. It may
be difficult to assess the level of judgment involved in some valuations prior to
accepting the engagement, and diversity in practice might result if the
assessment were left up to the individual professional or firm. Alternatively,
rules could incorporate a list of common services that are permitted versus
those that are prohibited; some believe, however, that such detail in an
independence standard is undesirable, and does not provide guidance to
professionals on new engagements or those not covered by the rule.
Level of Comfort Requested from the Appraisal / Valuation Specialist

35. Some believe that the independence rules regarding auditor provision of
appraisal and valuation services should make distinctions based on the level of
comfort expected from the audit firm valuation specialist. For example, in some
European countries, a company’s auditors may be asked to report on assets
contributed to the company in exchange for company stock (“contribution-inkind” reports).10 These reports describe the non-cash consideration contributed
and the methods used (by third parties) to value the assets, and state whether
the value of the contributed assets is at least equal to the value of the shares
issued in exchange.

10 Some countries (Sweden, Belgium, and Italy) currently require that the company’s auditor furnish the
contribution-in-kind report, creating a problem for auditors of SEC registrants in these countries in
complying with both SEC and local rules. The SEC Staff has objected to audit firm issuance of these
reports for audit clients, stating that the firms would not confirm that their reports do not express an opinion
on the fairness of the transaction, the value of the security, or the adequacy of consideration to
shareholders.
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36. Current rules prohibit the auditor from issuing “fairness opinions” for
audit clients - an opinion, for example, on the fairness of the proposed
purchase or sale price of an asset or business, or of an exchange ratio in a
business combination. The SEC Staff has also objected to auditor issuance of
these contribution-in-kind reports, as the Staff believes that they are akin to
fairness opinions. Others argue that these reports are fundamentally different
from fairness opinions, in that the auditor reviews the valuations prepared by
others in issuing a contribution-in-kind report, and the report issued clearly
notes this reliance. In contrast, in issuing a fairness opinion, the specialist
performs the underlying valuation work. Proponents of auditor provision of
these services analogize to the rules governing prospective financial
information; the auditor cannot prepare this information for an audit client, but
is permitted to examine and report on projections and forecasts prepared by
others. They assert that the independence rules governing appraisal and
valuation work should make distinctions based on the level of responsibility
assumed by the auditor. Independence standards, they believe, should permit
valuation engagements that are more akin to a review of another’s work, as this
is a natural counterpart to the audit function.

Disclosure of Assumptions in the Financial Statements

37. In setting standards, others would allow routine valuations, such as those
performed for pension and other post-employment benefit liabilities, where
disclosure in the financial statements is required of the assumptions used. The
reasoning behind this proposed exception is that the appraiser may be more
likely to maintain objectivity knowing that the significant assumptions inherent
in his or her work would be publicly disclosed in detail in the financial
statements.
38. Others might argue that financial statement users should not have to
assess the reasonableness of the assumptions inherent in a valuation expert’s
work. This, they believe, is the job of the auditor. They contend that disclosure
of such assumptions does not mitigate the potential for diminished auditor
objectivity resulting from the fact that the auditor’s colleagues performed the
underlying work. Just as some believe that disclosure is no cure for bad
accounting, they would argue that disclosure is no cure for impaired
independence.

Financial Statement Impact

39. Some may believe that the threats to auditor independence posed by self
review are sufficient to warrant prohibitions against auditors appraising
financial statement items. They may not believe, however, that the “mutuality
of interests” threat is compelling, and accordingly, would allow audit firms to
value non-financial statement items for audit clients. Therefore, they would
permit the auditor, for example, to allocate the market capitalization of an audit
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client to its separate divisions, but would prohibit a derivatives expert from the
audit firm from valuing that client’s derivatives portfolio.
40. Or, standards could distinguish between valuation work that might have a
direct impact on the financial statements of an audit client, versus work that
may only have an indirect effect. Rules might be structured to permit the audit
firm to perform appraisals for tax purposes, which have indirect financial
statement consequences, and to value the collateral supporting a loan, even
though such an appraisal may result in an indication of loan impairment. On
the other hand, such rules would prohibit the auditor from determining the
amount that the audit client should record to reflect its environmental
liabilities.
41. Others might argue that some valuation work, regardless of financial
statement impact, places audit firm professionals too much in the role of
management. They would ask whether investors would feel comfortable
knowing that audit firm professionals advised the audit client on the price to
pay for a business, or on how much to charge for their products. They believe
that the auditor requires a certain perspective and distance from the client to
perform effectively, and that provision of these services inappropriately “blurs
the line” between the auditor and management.

Potential Safeguards
Additional Reviews
42. Some believe that appraisal specialists in audit firms can effectively
perform appraisals and valuations for audit clients without impinging on audit
quality only if certain safeguards to protect auditor independence and
objectivity are employed. For example, SEC Practice Section standards
currently require review of the audit engagement by a second partner (the
concurring reviewer). This second review is not meant to duplicate the work
done by the engagement partner and other senior audit personnel in its
entirety. Instead, the second review is focused on the riskier aspects of the
audit - on those areas where there is a great degree of judgment required on the
part of the auditor. If audit firms were allowed to perform appraisals for audit
clients, then the second review could also focus on the appraisal project and its
impact on the audit as a result of any potential threats to auditor
independence. Standards could require the reviewer to make specific inquiries
regarding audit client sophistication and management’s ability to evaluate
assumptions and results. These rules could also require the reviewer to
ascertain whether the audit team evaluated the appraisal with appropriate
skepticism, and whether the team complied with the requirements of SAS 73.
43. In addition, the concurring review could assess the audit team’s overall
program of safeguards with respect to firm valuation work, and compliance with
requirements could be tested in peer review (review of the firm’s quality control
procedures by an outside firm - a requirement for AICPA SEC Practice Section
members) and in internal inspections conducted within the firm.
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44. Others suggest that a similar concurring review requirement could be
imposed on the appraisal or valuation work performed by the valuation
specialists in the audit firm. They believe formal policies should be established
requiring review of all firm valuation work by a second firm appraiser. Although
the audit team may still be subject to the threats to independence identified in
this discussion memo, ultimately, financial reporting problems are more likely
when the original valuation work is somehow flawed (and less likely when the
work is done right). Using similar reasoning - that quality work mitigates the
threats to accurate financial reporting posed by audit firm provision of non
audit services, including appraisals and valuations - and in response to self
review concerns, they would suggest requirements to have a third party, for
example, check software programs used by the firm to perform this work. Some
believe that this safeguard could be combined with others to adequately protect
the independence of the audit team when firm specialists perform appraisal and
valuation services.

Discussion of Services Performed with the Audit Committee

45. The Independence Standards Board’s Standard No. 1, Independence
Discussions with Audit Committees, requires the auditor to disclose in writing
and discuss with the audit committee of the client all relationships between the
auditor and the company that may reasonably be thought to bear on
independence. If auditor provision of appraisal and valuation services were
permitted, some believe the requirement to discuss these services with a
company’s audit committee would help protect auditor independence.
Knowledge that the services provided will be discussed with the audit
committee, as surrogates for shareholders, may bring additional focus to
potential independence threats, and ensure that appropriate safeguards are in
place to preserve the independence of the audit team.

Audit of a Subsidiary by Another Firm

46. Another suggested safeguard is to require another accounting firm to
perform the audit of any subsidiaries for which the primary auditor performed
valuation work. The primary auditor would rely on the audit of the subsidiary
performed by the other firm - a firm that would not be subject to the
independence threats posed by the performance of appraisal and valuation
services. Even if the second auditor is in the position of using the primary
auditor’s appraisal or valuation report as audit evidence, this group argues, the
second auditor wouldn’t have any reason to view the report with less skepticism
than a report from a third party. Others believe that the rules should combine
this safeguard with the ability to assess the materiality of the valuation services
provided by the auditor. They do not see why a separate audit should be
required (with the degree of precision associated with an audit of an individual
company versus the precision required when the company is part of a
consolidated group) if the subsidiary itself is immaterial to the consolidated
financial statements, or if the valuation work performed by the auditor is
inconsequential.
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Firewalls
47. Finally, some believe that firewalls could effectively separate the audit
team from the appraisal and valuation specialists in the audit firm. If these
groups were located in separate divisions, each with a separate group of
supervisors, they argue that some of the concerns would be mitigated related to
self-review and the development of an inappropriate mutuality of interests
between the audit team and the client. Existing audit rules require the auditor
to communicate with firm personnel responsible for non-audit services if such
services might result in information that has audit implications.11 This group
contends, however, that firms could be structured so that the audit team’s
motivation to question less skeptically the work performed by others within the
firm would be minimized. In addition, if the auditor did not identify strongly
with the firm appraisal specialists because of structural separation within the
firm, the risk of the auditor developing a mutuality of interests with the client
because of jointly-developed projections would diminish. Others disagree with
this contention, arguing that the auditor’s objectivity could be influenced by the
knowledge that the appraisal or valuation was prepared by a professional within
his or her firm, even if the audit and appraisal groups were structurally distinct
and isolated.

Questions for Respondents
Q1.
Has the DM identified all the threats to auditor independence posed by
auditor provision of appraisal and valuation services? If not, please describe
the additional threats and whether they should result in any proscriptions of
services by auditors.

Q2.
Should standards governing auditor provision of these services make
distinctions based on the materiality of the appraised items? If so, how would
you judge materiality?
Q3.
Are there benefits that may exceed the costs - the potential threats to
independence - of allowing audit firms to provide these services to audit clients?
If so, what are these benefits?

Q4.
Do you believe that the methodology used in some appraisals is more
established and subject to fewer alternatives than in others? Are the required
assumptions in some appraisals more routine, based on published statistics, or
otherwise less subjective than in others? If you believe that these differences
exist, should auditor independence standards make distinctions based on these
differences? If so, please provide some examples of services that should be
permitted as well as those that should be prohibited.

Q5.
Should auditor independence standards governing these services
distinguish between engagements where the valuation specialist is performing
the underlying valuation work versus those in which he or she reviews and
11 AICPA Professional Standards, AU Section 311.04(b), Planning and Supervision.
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relies upon the work of third parties (e.g., European contribution-in-kind
reports)?

Q6.
Do you believe that standards should allow firm specialists to value
financial statement amounts for firm audit clients when the assumptions
inherent in the valuation work are fully disclosed in the financial statements?

Q7.
Should auditor independence standards governing these services
distinguish between appraisals and valuations that have a direct financial
statement impact versus those that have no financial statement consequences,
or only indirect consequences? If so, how would these standards operate?
Q8.

Are there other distinctions that these standards should contemplate?

Q9.
Do you believe that the safeguards outlined in the DM could effectively
protect auditor independence when the audit firm provides appraisal and
valuation services to an audit client? Are there other safeguards that would be
effective?
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